We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity.
|Número de páginas||21|
|Publicación||International Journal of Game Theory|
|Estado||Publicada - 1 mar. 2020|
|Publicado de forma externa||Sí|
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