We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.
|Número de páginas||35|
|Publicación||Review of Economic Design|
|Estado||Publicada - 1 jun. 2020|
|Publicado de forma externa||Sí|
Nota bibliográficaPublisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.