A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

Alfredo Valencia-Toledo; Juan Vidal-Puga

doi:10.1007/s10058-020-00230-7

A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

Alfredo Valencia-Toledo, Juan Vidal-Puga

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	65-99
Number of pages	35
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	24
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00230-7
State	Published - 1 Jun 2020
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

Keywords

Bargaining
Land rental
Nash solution
Non-cooperative game

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10.1007/s10058-020-00230-7

Cite this

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title = "A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements",

abstract = "We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors{\textquoteright} merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.",

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AU - Vidal-Puga, Juan

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N2 - We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.

AB - We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.

KW - Bargaining

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KW - Non-cooperative game

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A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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