A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

Alfredo Valencia-Toledo, Juan Vidal-Puga

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)65-99
Number of pages35
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2020
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Alfredo Valencia-Toledo thanks the Ministry of Education of Peru for its financial support through the “Beca Presidente de la República” Grant of the “Programa Nacional de Becas y Crédito Educativo (PRONABEC)”. Juan Vidal-Puga acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through Grant ECO2014-52616-R., Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad through Grant ECO2017-82241-R, and Xunta de Galicia (ED431B 2019/34)

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.


  • Bargaining
  • Land rental
  • Nash solution
  • Non-cooperative game


Dive into the research topics of 'A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this